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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues 
that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and 
provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion 
(hereinafter "D&E,).I To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are 
procompetitive? It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts 
can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so 
rare they should have little impact on public policy? D&E then asserts that 
efficiencies from discounts are common and significant.4 It then asserts that the 
only way to bring clarity, predictability, and an acceptable Type Iffype II error 
balance to this area is to adopt the rules that D&E suggests, including complete 
legality for all single-product discounts (unless the discounting violates normal 
predatory pricing rules).5 
D&E's conclusions rest, as they should, on empirical assumptions6 about 
the relative importance of various procompetitive and anticompetitive effects 
of discounts, and also on the significance of efficiencies from discounting. 
Every one of these empirical judgments is plausible. But how do policymakers 
know they are correct? Why are some of D&E's arguments in its text, while 
others are only in the footnotes? Where is the evidence justifying this decision 
to give credibility and importance to certain arguments and to make certain 
assumptions and denigrate others?7 Suppose policymakers instead made very 
different, yet equally plausible, assumptions; especially assumptions about the 
probable competitive effects of "retroactive" or "all units" discounts.8 Unlike 
*Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Director, American 
Antitrust Institute. The author would like to thank Albert Foer, Mark Glick, and Jonathan Rubin 
for valuable comments, and Alice Arcieri for helpful research assistance. 
I See Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841. 
2See id. at 843. 
3See id. at 847 & n.28. 
4See id. at 843. 
SId. at 844. 
6"These premises speak for the following conclusions .... " Id. at 84~5. 
7Professor Hovenkamp, always the careful scholar, never uses inappropriate absolutist 
language. He never says that "all" discounts are procompetitive or that "none" are. However, he 
is making policy conclusions based upon his empirical assessment of the relative frequency and 
weighting of various scenarios. He provides no basis for these implicit presumptions. 
SNote that "first dollar" or "all-units" discounts are only one of many ways to generate a 
retrospective rebate. It is this retrospective character that makes these "discounts" problematic. 
There is, however, no settled language that is universally understood to identify these rebate 
schemes from more benign prospective discounts. The DG Competition Paper calls them 
"Conditional Rebates." See EUROPEAN COMM'N, DG COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE 
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"regular" discounts, which are almost always procompetitive, retroactive 
discounts have a strong exclusionary and anticompetitive potential. If different 
presumptions were made about the presumptive effects on consumer welfare of 
retroactive discounts, a very different set of policy recommendations would 
instead be appropriate.9 
The purpose of this Article is to analyze a few of the most important 
empirical judgments or presumptions in D&E and the policy conclusions that 
flow from them. This Article argues that, because there is no support for these 
empirical assertions, policymakers should reject D&E's policy suggestions. 
ApPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES q[ 137, at 39 (2005) 
[hereinafter DG COMPETITION PAPER], available at http://ec.europa.euicomm/competition/ 
antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf. Others call them "all-units discounts," "quantity-forcing 
contracts," or "loyalty rebates." The distinguishing characteristic is a large lump-sum rebate 
triggered, explicitly or implicitly, by reaching a target quantity or share. Regardless of the name 
used, it seems wise to distinguish between the effects of rebates triggered by attaining a target 
quantity, and discounts that apply to units beyond the target. As will be discussed infra, the 
former can have especially strong exclusionary effects. 
9This Article focuses upon empiricism in part due to the teaching of Professor John Flynn, 
who stressed to the author on many occasions that sound economic policy judgments must 
reflect the real world. 
Professor Mark Glick, my co-presenter at the conference honoring Professor Flynn, 
recounts a story that is a typical illustration of Professor Flynn's empirical concerns. Professor 
Glick recounts how, as a young economist in industrial organization at the University of Utah, 
he often met with Professor Flynn in his office or over lunch. At each meeting, Professor Flynn 
would emphasize that the problem with economics was that all too often it ignored the facts. 
Professor Glick, then solely an economist by training, never understood what he meant. 
Professor Flynn advised Glick to attend law school, but after he graduated, Glick still did not 
understand Flynn's point. Today, after practicing antitrust law for fifteen years, Professor Glick 
told the conference that he finally understands the truth of what Professor Flynn had been saying 
all those years. One of the important contributions Professor Flynn has made to the use of 
economics in antitrust has been his stressing of the truism that economic theory cannot replace 
facts with unsupported presumptions. Instead, the proper role of economics is to function as a 
tool that helps one to work through the logic of the situation and to draw conclusions only in 
light of the relevant facts. 
Glick gave the following example to contrast the views of Professors Flynn and 
Hovenkamp. Assume a situation exists where single-product predation is alleged. The facts are 
that prices are above cost, but efficient entry is blockaded because of first-mover effects and 
scale economies. Moreover, the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent. How would this 
situation be addressed by Professors Flynn and Hovenkamp? 
Glick stated that Professor Hovenkamp would just apply the rule that above-cost pricing is 
per se legal. The entrant therefore has no antitrust remedy. The justification is that in most cases 
only inefficient entrants are excluded by this rule. But under an approach likely to be advocated 
by Professor Flynn, Professor Glick said that we should not use a rule in the first place. Instead, 
Professor Flynn would at most apply only presumptions. In this case, Professor Flynn probably 
would employ a presumption that above-cost pricing only excludes inefficient entrants, but he 
would give the entrant a chance to rebut this presumption. 
Professor Glick then recounted that in real antitrust cases discovery is typically a multi-
year process and there is no reason why courts cannot distinguish between efficient entrants and 
less efficient ones. 
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Finally, some policy alternatives are proposed for consideration by the antitrust 
communi ty . 
II. EMPIRICAL JUDGMENTS IN "DISCOUNTS & EXCLUSION" 
A. "The Great Majority of Discounting Practices Are Procompetitive ,'\0 
As a general matter, the assertion that most discounting practices are 
procompetitive is surely true. But, is this presumption still true when these 
discounts are given by monopolists, by monopolists for the first time facing the 
prospects of significant new entry, or by would-be monopolists that are 
targeting rivals? Where is the empirical evidence that discounts in these 
situations usually are procompetitive? Would a market power screen ll and a 
very different presumption make a better policy prescription? D&E provides 
no empirical foundation that would support Professor Hovenkarnp's 
conclusions. Nor do I know of any evidence in other literature that contains the 
missing information. Moreover, for single-product discounts D&E focuses 
primarily on "progressive discounts;" for example, discounts given only on 
units beyond a certain threshold but not on units below the threshold (i.e., a 
10% discount on all purchases exceeding 1000 per month).12 However, as the 
hypothetical discussed in Section B below shows, "all-unit" or retroactive 
discounts have a much larger anticompetitive potential. There is no reason to 
believe that a policy appropriate for forward-looking discounts is appropriate 
for retroactive discounts. 13 
I~ovenkamp, supra note I, at 843 (initial capitalization added). 
II A market power screen would have to be crafted to avoid "cellophane fallacy" problems. 
See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: 
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 634-36 (5th ed. 2003). See generally Donald F. Turner, Antitrust 
Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REv; 281, 303-19 (1956). 
12Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 845-48. 
I3See DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, 'll118, at 34 ("If the dominant company with 
its low prices selectively targets specific customers and in particular when these customers are 
the actual customers of one or more particular rivals in the market, this may be an important part 
of the evidence of a predatory strategy. Such prices can be designed to damage a competitor's 
viability and to foreclose the market while limiting the losses incurred by the dominant company 
to those arising from the targeted sales. The same holds in case the low prices are selectively 
targeted at those customers that might switch to a potential entrant in case entry is imminent. 
Such evidence may be considered stronger if also other exclusionary practices can be shown. On 
the other hand, a general price decrease applied to all the output of the dominant company is in 
general less likely to be part of a predatory strategy. With a general price decrease the dominant 
company will not have the possibility to off-set its losses with profits earned on other sales and 
the losses will usually be higher, making recoupment less likely. The latter point about a market 
wide price decrease may have less force of argument if the market is more prone to pre-emption 
due to characteristics such as network effects or if the dominant company is active on a number 
of adjacent markets where predation in one market may help to build up a reputation of being an 
aggressive competitor for all markets." (citation omitted)); see also id. 'll'll152-53, at 44 
("Conditional rebates that are granted on all purchases in the reference period once a certain 
threshold is exceeded can have a strong foreclosure effect." (citation omitted)). 
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B. "Market Share or Quantity Discounts Aid Sellers in Long-Run Output 
Planning ,,14 
While I certainly do not dispute that long-run output planning efficiencies 
can occur, the crucial empirical questions are: How often is it true, how 
important is this effect, and how much weight should be given to this factor?15 
Could long-term planning be facilitated as well, or almost as well, in ways 
other than discounting? Could discounting also have exclusionary effects? If 
discounts could be exclusionary, how should the exclusionary effects be 
balanced against the procompetitive effects?16 Again, where is the empirical 
evidence for any conclusion about any of these variables? Without this 
evidence how do we know how much weight to give the possibility of long-
term planning efficiencies that D&E discusses? Again, there simply is no 
support for D&E's conclusions, and the contrary policy prescription might also 
be correct. 
C. "The Economic Case for Condemning Price Discrimination as Such is 
Close to Nonexistent "I? 
If this passage means. that there is a virtually nonexistent case for 
condemning all uses of price discrimination by all firms in all contexts, then it 
surely is correct. But does this passage instead mean that almost all price 
discrimination by monopolists, by monopolists changing their pricing policies 
in the face of attempted entry, or by would-be monopolists, is benign or 
procompetitive? If so, again I respectfully ask for the empirical basis for this 
conclusion. Finding no evidence in D&E or elsewhere, I urge decision makers 
to ignore it, especially in light of the fact that price discrimination results in 
wealth transfer effects that usually are ignored. 
14Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 843 (initial capitalization added). 
15If the fact that discounting sometimes can aid sellers in long-run planning is accepted as 
a complete justification for otherwise questionable practices, then even below-cost pricing 
should be per se legal because what can be better for long-term planning than pricing below-
cost, destroying your competitors, and then raising prices? Why does Professor Hovenkamp 
accept this argument in the discounting context but not the predatory pricing context when, 
according to D&E, the two practices should be treated the same? See id. at 844. Similarly, if the 
contracts in Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 2000), 
had been long-term, Professor Hovenkamp agrees they would have been viewed more 
suspiciously. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 846-47 & n.27 (discussing duration in quantity 
discount practices as found in Concord Boat). Yet, longer term contracts certainly would have 
aided the seller's long-term planning. 
16Evidence of one possible efficiency-even evidence of a guaranteed efficiency-from 
discounting should not end the legal inquiry. Even old-fashioned horizontal price fixing can lead 
to efficiencies-it often will save on consumer search costs and on advertising costs. Yet, most 
agree that price fixing should remain per se illegal. 
17Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 859 (initial capitalization added). 
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It is well known that price discrimination can be efficient or inefficient, 
depending upon the circumstances of its use. 18 As before, the key issues are 
empirical: in specific situations (e.g., when used by monopolists facing new 
entry) what is the ratio of procompetitive to anticompetitive uses of price 
discrimination? 
Moreover, most economic analyses of price discrimination proceed upon 
the assumption that only efficiency considerations should count in the 
analysis. 19 Suppose, however, as has been asserted,20 conceivably even by 
Professor Hovenkamp,21 that the Congress that passed the Sherman Act also 
had "wealth transfer" or property protection goals. Suppose the antitrust laws 
were passed in large part because of congressional displeasure over the higher 
prices (and the accompanying wealth transfersi2 to some purchasers that arose 
from cartels, etc.23 Suppose Congress wanted these wealth transfers from 
consumers to cartels and monopolies, when caused by this market power, to 
count as a negative or anticompetitive factor in antitrust analysis. 
Price discrimination almost always causes significant wealth transfer 
effects.24 What would be the result of counting these effects (in addition to 
efficiency effects) when we analyze price discrimination? What would happen 
to conclusions about the empirical balance between the procompetitive and 
anticompetitive uses of price discrimination? As Professor Hovenkamp 
observed elsewhere, "All forms of persistent price discrimination transfer 
18See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION 
AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.5, at 576-78 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing price discrimination and antitrust 
policy, especially § 14.5a, entitled The Social Cost of Price Discrimination). 
19See, e.g., id. § 14.5a (discussing efficiency issues in pricing strategies). 
20See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of 
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 82-106 (1982); see 
also Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 536 (1983) 
('''Consumer welfare' embraces what individual consumers are entitled to expect from a 
competitive economy. If the efficiency extremists insist that only their definition of consumer 
welfare is recognized by economists, we would answer that ours is clearly recognized by the 
statutes. The legislative history of the Sherman Act is not clear on much, but it is clear on this."). 
21Commenting on the legislative history of the antitrust laws, Professor Hovenkamp 
concluded: "Bork's work [asserting that Congress cared only about efficiency] has been called 
into question by subsequent scholarship showing that ... Congress had no real concept of 
efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers from unfavorable wealth 
transfers." Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy after Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 250 
(1985). "[T]he legislative history of the Sherman Act shows a great deal of concern for the fact 
that monopolists transfer wealth away from consumers, but no concern at all for any articulated 
concept of efficiency." HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 576 (citation omitted). However, 
elsewhere he seems to suggest that he does not believe that these transfers should be counted in 
antitrust analysis. See id. § 2.1, especially at 50. 
22Supracompetitive prices cause both allocative inefficiency and a transfer of wealth from 
purchasers to the firm or firms with monopoly power. Economists usually consider the allocative 
inefficiency effects of this monopoly power in their analyses but rarely consider the wealth 
transfer effects. For a discussion, see Lande, supra note 20, at 72-74. 
23 See id. (citation omitted). 
24See HOVENKAMP, supra note 18, at 576. 
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wealth away from consumers and toward sellers. If antitrust policy is 
concerned with such wealth transfers, then price discrimination presents an 
antitrust problem. The question is more complex if economic efficiency is not 
the exclusive goal of the federal antitrust laws.,,25 
The majority opinion in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No.2 v. Hyde26 
can best be explained as condemning certain instances of tying to price 
discriminate because of its wealth transfer effects. While the Court certainly 
appreciated the efficiencies that can result from tying,27 it also complained that 
tying "may be used as a counting device to effect price discrimination.,,28 
Furthermore, the court asserted that tying could be anticompetitive because it 
"can increase the social costs of market power by facilitating price 
discrimination, thereby increasing the monopoly profits over what they would 
be absent the tie.,,29 The Court explained in more detail how tying as a means 
to price discriminate can cause anticompetitive transfers of wealth from 
purchasers to firms with monopoly power: "Sales of the tied item can be used 
to measure demand for the tying item; purchasers with greater needs for the 
tied item make larger purchases and in effect must pay a higher price to obtain 
the tying item.,,3o By contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was 
more ambivalent about price discrimination.31 
To my knowledge an empirical analysis of the welfare effects of price 
discrimination in the discounting context that D&E considers, an analysis that 
includes its wealth transfer effects,32 has never been performed. But how else 
251d. (citation omitted). The complexity of price discrimination analysis, even under an 
efficiency standard, can be iIlustrated by focusing on a part of D&E's analysis that appears to be 
incorrect. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 858-59. 
D&E concludes that bundling is efficient because it increases total production (from two 
units in the case in which the goods are sold separately to four units in the case in which they are 
sold as a bundle). The reason given is that the combined price of the goods ($150) is equal to 
their combined marginal cost. An output criterion, however, is the wrong criterion to apply. The 
unit of good B that is sold to customer 1 and the unit of good A that is sold to customer 2 should 
not be produced when they are valued by the consumers at less than their marginal costs of 
production ($40 vs. $50 for customer 1 and $90 vs. $100 for customer 2). This example actuaIly 
illustrates how bundling can be inefficient and over-inclusive, i.e., it can force consumers to buy 
goods for which they have a lower valuation than the goods' social cost. This example also 
shows that output does not always correlate perfectly with efficiency. The output rule of thumb 
is not always valid, especiaIly when price discrimination is involved. 
26466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
27ld. at 12. 
28ld. at 13 n.l9. 
29/d. at 14-15. 
30ld. at 15 n.23. 
31"Tying might be undesirable in two other instances .... Tying may also help the seIler 
engage in price discrimination by 'metering' the buyer's use of the tying product. Price 
discrimination may be independently unlawful. Price discrimination may, however, decrease 
rather than increase the economic costs of a seIler's market power." ld. at 36 n.4 (O'Connor, I., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
32Another complexity arises from the fact that price discrimination does not necessarily 
entail only a transfer from consumers to the monopolist. Relative to a single-price regime, price 
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could one be certain enough to decide which rule-a rule almost always 
permitting discounts, or a rule sometimes or usually forbidding discounts by 
monopolists, for example-would be in the public interest?33 
D. Discounting Is So Similar to Predatory Pricing That It Should Be 
Governed by Predatory Pricing Rules34 
While discounting does share many of the characteristics of predatory 
pricing, it lacks one of its integral elements. The essence of predatory pricing is 
a short-term lowering of price and a short-term sacrifice of profit so that the 
dominant firm (or would-be dominant finn) can gain a long-term monopoly 
profit. However, as Section III demonstrates below, discounts (or practices that 
appear to be discounts) often involve no such sacrifice. 
Moreover, the world of predatory pricing has become a monopolist's 
paradise. Even though many respected scholars believe that anticompetitive 
predatory pricing exists and is not rare,35 successful predatory pricing 
judgments are exceedingly rare.36 Only a few cases even survive summary 
judgment?7 Indeed, the daunting possibility of filing a predatory pricing suit 
can even be contemplated only by "the most sophisticated and wealthy 
plaintiffs.,,38 If we expand the world of predatory pricing analysis to 
encompass discounting practices, we are implicitly making the conservative 
empirical judgment that this is an area of law that we want to make almost per 
se legal. 39 Why should policymakers make this decision without backing it up 
with a reasonable amount of evidence suggesting that it is the appropriate 
approach? Section IV, Lessons from Predatory Pricing Rulemaking, shows 
how such an analysis should be carried out. 
discrimination could also transfer surplus from consumer group A (e.g., low-elasticity 
consumers, who pay a higher price) to consumer group B (e.g., high-elasticity consumers, who 
pay a lower price) and also to the monopolist. Any analysis of wealth transfer effects of price 
discrimination should also account for this type of effect. 
33See DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, 'lI 140, at 40 ("Another possible negative 
effect of rebate systems is price discrimination between the different buyers."). Paragraph 179 
refers to price discrimination as an anticompetitive effect of tying arrangements. [d. 'lI 179, at 54. 
34Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 844. 
3S"We argue first that theory does not suggest that predation does not exist or even that it is 
rare. We then show that the empirical evidence also fails to suggest it is rare." Richard O. Zerbe, 
Jr. & Michael T. Mumford, Does Predatory Pricing Exist? Economic Theory and the Courts 
after Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 950, 952 (1996); see also id. at 957-64 (discussing 
cases that concern predatory pricing). 
36/d. at 951, 968-75. Moreover, predatory pricing litigation is always tremendously 
expensive and often unpredictable, particularly for plaintiffs since they lack knowledge of 
defendants' costs. Only a few cases survive. 
37/d. at 956. 
38/d. at 977. 
39 Although the decision to expand the reach of predatory pricing rules might appear to be 
ideologically neutral, as a practical matter it has a (perhaps unintended) strong pro-defendant, 
pro-monopolist result. 
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E. Economic Modeling Shows That Anticompetitive Discounting Scenarios 
Tend to Be Highly Complex, Often Making Unrealistic Assumptions40 
If the asserted anticompetitive uses of discounting are indeed overly 
complex and rely on unrealistic assumptions, and therefore are empirically 
insignificant, then of course they should be relegated to footnotes and not 
influence public policy. While this surely is true about some of the models 
showing anticompetitive uses of discounting that have been formulated, I will 
offer a simple, intuitively plausible, anticompetitive example that relies, in 
effect, on some of the assumptions that Professor Hovenkamp has relegated to 
his footnotes. This hypothetical is based on early, never proven, allegations 
against Microsoft.41 
III. A SIMPLE, INTUITIVELY PLAUSIBLE COUNTEREXAMPLE 
Suppose there were a hypothetical personal computer ("PC") operating 
system ("OS") monopolist called Microsoft ("MS") and that a hypothetical 
firm called Linux is trying to enter the as market by distributing its product 
through computer manufacturers or assemblers, known as original equipment 
manufacturers ("OEMs,,).42 Suppose that MS's marginal cost of making 
another copy of its as is approximately zero,43 that it sells its ass for $100 
each, and that it sells 1000 units a month to a particular OEM. Suppose 
Linux's as is equal in quality to MS's, that Linux is an equally efficient as 
producer, and that Linux is willing to sell copies of its as for $50 each.44 If 
Linux were able to enter this market it certainly would be beneficial for 
competition. 
Suppose Linux went to an OEM and said, "While we would love to get all 
of your business, we realize that it would be too risky for you to shift all of 
your computer production to PCs that use our as. Why not buy 200 next 
month-20% of your requirements-at only $50 each, as a test, and see how 
well your PCs that run on Linux sell? You will save money and find that Linux 
40Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 843 (initial capitalization added). He also writes: 
"Anticompetitive theories are legion, but they are also complex." [d. at 861. 
41This hypothetical is an updated version of an early allegation made against Microsoft 
brought by Digital Research, Inc., which the author helped represent. None of these allegations 
were ever resolved or even reviewed by any court, so this example should be considered a 
complete hypothetical. 
42The original allegation made against Microsoft involved an operating system called 
ORDaS. 
43In reality, the marginal cost of producing another copy of an as is not zero. If the 
hypothetical were to include, for example, a $1 marginal cost for each additional as, the 
hypothetical's numbers would be more complicated, but its logic and lessons would be 
unaffected. 
440ther necessary assumptions include significant barriers to entry into a market that is 
well-defined for antitrust purposes. 
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is just as good as MS' s OS, that customers will purchase machines containing 
Linux just as readily, and that you will have no more service calls or 
complaints from customers." 
Suppose that MS quickly finds out about Linux's offer to sell 200 units to 
the OEM for $50 each and responds to this attempted entry by changing its 
pricing structure. Suppose that, when the OEM goes to MS and asks to 
purchase only 800 units for the month, MS tells the OEM that their prices for 
their OS have risen, to $125 each. But then MS quickly adds that if the OEM 
buys 1000 units, MS will give them a quantity discount, down to only $100 
each for every copy they purchase. 
The OEM would quickly calculate that in light of MS's new pricing 
system, it does not make sense to purchase any copies from Linux for $50 per 
unit, or even for $1 each. If the OEM only purchases 800 units from MS, it 
would pay 800 x $125, which totals $100,000. On the other hand, if it 
purchases all 1000 units from MS, then it would pay MS 1000 x $100, which 
also equals $100,000. From the perspective of the OEM, the incremental 
units-the units between 800 and 1000 units purchased-are free. From the 
OEM's perspective, why should it pay $50 each to Linux for those 200 
additional units, or any positive amount, when the established firm will in 
effect give them to the OEM for free? From MS's perspective, it still gets its 
same $100,000 per month from this OEM.4s In addition, the quantity discount 
has excluded their would-be competitor. 
The nascent entrant's only possible counter-strategy would be to try to 
convince the OEM to completely switch its OS purchases to Linux; to buy all 
1000 units from Linux for a price of, say, $50 or even $25 each.46 However, 
this would be an extremely risky contract for the OEM to agree to.47 It is one 
thing for an OEM to test-market a critical new product on 20% of its 
production. It is quite another undertaking for the OEM to "bet the company," 
and shift all of its production to an unknown newcomer to the market.48 While 
45Presumably this is the profit-maximizing price. 
46Quantity forcing caused by monopoly power also may make its rival or would-be rival 
compete for very large quantity increments at prices above marginal cost (so as not to be deemed 
predatory) that make the sales of the incremental units unprofitable for the rival. By contrast, the 
dominant firm can make a contribution to fixed costs on these marginal units, making these sales 
profitable. 
47Linux may face obstacles in addition to risk. For example, if the OEMs have staggered 
their long-term contracts with Microsoft, a large share of the market may be tied up at any given 
moment and cannot be captured by a prospective entrant. 
As a practical matter, at any given time some percentage of purchases are absolutely 
locked into being supplied by the monopolist by contract, another percentage is close to being 
locked in by sunk costs or third-party requirements, another percentage is more contestable 
depending upon switching costs, and a final segment is readily contestable. 
48Demand for the new product is likely to be low at first and spread out among categories 
of customers and geographic locations. Demand might gradually build for Linux, but it would be 
very difficult for anyone OEM to sell to that demand. Its distribution costs, at least for a while, 
would be too expensive to enable it to earn a profit. Moreover, there could be a chicken-and-egg 
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theoretically possible, reason tells us that such a dramatic switch would be 
unlikely to happen and there is no systematic empirical learning to counteract 
this logic.49 
Since the marginal cost of making another copy of an OS is close to 
zero,so MS's "discounted" sales at $100 each would likely pass any predatory 
pricing test. Their discounting could be immunized even if the court adopts the 
refinement of the average variable cost standard, advocated in footnote 9 of 
Professor Hovenkamp's articleS! and the recent discussion draft of The DG 
situation concerning demand; consumers may only demand a product (especially one involving 
significant network effects) if it is widely available or widely used. 
Sudden movements of large percentages of buyers or sellers are often unsettling. For 
example, Denmark sold a considerable amount of dairy products to the Middle East before a 
Danish newspaper published cartoons featuring Mohammed. This caused a widespread Muslim 
boycott of Danish products. No doubt in the long run Denmark will be able to sell its dairy 
products elsewhere. But in the short run the damage from the Muslim boycott has been 
considerable. 
49Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 849-856; see also DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, 'lI 
154, at 45 (,,[T]hese competitors can not compete for an individual customer's entire 
demand .... "). Paragraph 143 explains: 
[T]hat for a good part of demand on the market there are no proper substitutes to 
the dominant supplier's product, because for instance its brand is a "must stock 
item" preferred by many final consumers or because the capacity constraints on the 
other suppliers are such that a good part of demand can only be provided for by the 
dominant supplier. For distributors it may be necessary to trade in the dominant 
supplier's products in order to be able to satisfy an important part of their customers' 
demand and in order to reach a viable scale of business. 
[d. 'lI143, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
50In reality, the marginal cost of making, distributing, and servicing customer calls would 
actually be significantly greater than zero. But it nevertheless would be extremely low compared 
to its price because software has such high fixed costs (the intellectual property component). For 
this reason software makes a good example. 
5lHovenkamp, supra note 1, at 842 n.9. Footnote 9 reads in part: 
As used here, the term "above-cost" refers to an appropriate measure of cost, 
without getting into the debate over what that measure is. Ordinarily, the measure is 
thought to be either short-run marginal cost or average variable cost. This does not 
necessarily mean the shortest run variable cost possible, however. For example, 
machinery that wears out is subject to use depreciation, which should be calculated 
into variable cost. 
More importantly, for some goods with a heavy intellectual property 
component, "cost" properly includes a pro rata portion of development costs, even 
though development costs are typically paid before the first sale and invariant to the 
quantity sold, and thus for most purposes are regarded as fixed. For example, if it 
costs $1 million to develop a computer program but only $5 to print the CD-ROM 
containing it plus the packaging, then a measure of variable costs that considers only 
the latter is too low. One must also consider reasonable development costs per unit. 
Thus, if we reasonably believe that this program will sell one million copies, $1 in 
development costs per unit should be added to the other variable costs. 
Problematically, pro rata development costs are very difficult to compute if the 
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Competition Paper, the European Union's competition enforcement unit 
proposae2 that includes the software's development costs. In this refinement 
Professor Hovenkamp argues that, for products with a very high intellectual 
property component, these development costs should be attributed to each item 
sold.53 While this refinement could help deter anticompetitive behavior, it is 
difficult to know how this test would be applied in practice.54 At a minimum it 
would complicate an already extremely costly, difficult to apply, lengthy to 
carry out, and defendant-friendly test, and it still could immunize many 
instances of anticompetitive discounting.55 
In this example, the monopolist's "discount" in actuality masks thinly 
disguised predatory pricing. If the seller engaged in transparent pricing, it 
would say that the price is $125 each for the first 800 units, and then zero for 
the next 200 units. But this type of honesty would be foolish; if they advertise 
to sell unit numbers 80 1 to 1000 for free, they would be found guilty of 
predatory pricing. Why should their discount veil be allowed to mask the 
underlying reality? Nevertheless, the disguise would work well enough to fool 
even an illustrious scholar like Professor Hovenkamp. 
Thus, this hypothetical illustrates a simple, intuitive case of the 
anticompetitive use of discounts (which actually should be termed "sham 
discounts") that are not based on efficiency.56 The discounts block entry or put 
the monopolist's rivals out of business in a way that harms competition and 
consumer welfare. This can of course mean higher prices for consumers, and it 
ld. 
product has not yet exhausted its market lifecycle because the fact finder will not 
know how many copies will be sold. 
52See DO COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, <]I 108, at 30 ("The AAC [Average Avoidable 
Cost, including variable cost and the overhead for the item in question] benchmark is the 
appropriate and practical answer to the question about avoidable losses."); id. <]I 109, at 31 ("This 
is however a rebuttable presumption; there may be exceptional circumstances under which a 
price below AAC is justified .... "); id. 'll 110, at 32 ("The presumption that below AAC the 
pricing of a dominant company can be assessed as predatory implies that once the Commission 
has established that the price charged was below AAC it does not need to further justify its 
decision with elements concerning the actual or likely exclusion of the prey, the predatory intent 
of the dominant company, its possibility to recoup the losses in the future .... In such a case, 
the dominant company may wish to take up these elements and other circumstances of the case 
to show that it can justify its pricing."). 
53See Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 842 n.9. 
5~is variation of the famous average variable cost rule, while logical, makes planning 
extremely difficult because (as Professor Hovenkamp notes) it would entail predicting the future 
sales of the item in question. ld. This test might be capable of being implemented in predatory 
pricing litigation taking years to conduct, during which period the product in question might 
have finished being produced. But since the results of this test cannot be predicted very well, it is 
far from optimal as a planning tool. 
55For example, if MS's OS had only modest intellectual property components, even 
attributing these costs to the incremental OSs might not be enough to condemn it. 
5~ey force rivals to sell a non-optimal quantity in a way that benefits no one other than 
the monopolist. 
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can also mean reduced short-term consumer choice and lower long-term 
innovation.57 Moreover, it uses an equilibrium strategy the monopolist can 
maintain, costlessly and indefinitely. 58 We could of course change the facts in 
this hypothetical in many possible ways. For example, the hypothetical would 
be relatively unaffected if we changed it so the monopolist charged a small 
amount for the marginal units, or we could build in a small marginal cost for 
the product in question, or we could, as Professor Hovenkamp suggests in 
footnote nine,59 incorporate the cost of the product's intellectual property.60 
Moreover, in the real world we often would have to struggle to define the 
output over which the discounts should be attributed. But in the end, depending 
on what the hypothetical (or real-world!) figures looked like, the analysis 
essentially would be the same, especially for discounts that retroactively apply 
to all sales, not just incremental sales. These "discounts" block entry, are not 
based on efficiency, and would not allow MS to reach customers who 
otherwise would not purchase their OS. Moreover, this discount aid to MS's 
long-term planning would be trivial, except insofar as guaranteeing its 
monopoly position would enhance its ability to plan. Yet, this discount 
probably would be immunized under Professor Hovenkamp's proposed 
standard-unless the reviewing court allocates the discount completely to the 
incremental output, as is suggested in Section II.D, above. 
IV. LESSONS FROM PREDATORY PRICING RULEMAKING 
Professor Hovenkamp thoughtfully analogizes the current situation to that 
of predatory pricing in the 1970s, when the antitrust field was faced with a 
large number of competing procompetitive and anti competitive explanations. 
The courts conducted rule of reason analyses in which they were supposed to 
sort out this chaos. Into this morass Professors Areeda and Turner promulgated 
57See DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, 'II 91, at 27; Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. 
Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 
ANTITRUSTL.J. 713, 715 (1997). 
58In other words, rather than set its OS prices at $100 each and then change them as a 
reaction to the threat of new entry, the monopoly coujd simply announce that, for this OEM, its 
price will always be $125 per unit if the OEM purchases 800 copies, and will always be $100 if 
it buys 100 copies. This would be somewhat more complicated for the monopolist to administer, 
but it would be revenue-neutral and would also have the effect of discouraging entry. 
59Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 842 n.9. 
6Opor example, suppose that the monopolist only lowered its price to $110 for all of the 
units purchased if a customer purchased 1000 units. This would mean that the customer's total 
cost for 800 units would be $100,000, while its total cost for 1000 units would be $110,000. 
Thus, the final 200 units would cost the purchaser a net of $10,000, which means that the final 
200 units would effectively be priced at $50 each. Alternatively, by choosing slightly different 
prices (e.g., by setting the high, stand-alone price charged by MS for the 800 units equal to $130 
instead of $125) the monopoly could generate a situation in which the additional 200 units are 
effectively sold at a negative price. 
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their famous average variable cost rule.61 As Professor Hovenkamp notes, their 
goal was not to formulate the perfect predatory pricing rule-that would have 
been impossible. Rather, their goal was to formulate a pretty good rule, one 
that had an acceptably small number of Type I and Type II errors and was 
relatively clear and predictable.62 
The antitrust world that existed in 1975 was such that Areeda and Turner 
could-and I admit to exaggeration because there was a considerable amount 
of scholarly debate-simply declare that they had figured out the best 
predatory pricing rule, and much of the antitrust world thereupon deferred to 
their wisdom and followed their suggestion, in whole or in part. However, the 
nature of the antitrust field has changed dramatically during the last thirty 
years. Today, anyone wanting to formulate policy rules should do so based on 
proven empirical as well as theoretical assessments. Let me illustrate how this 
process should work by continuing the predatory pricing analogy. 
A model for the antitrust world to use is the approach to predatory pricing 
rule making contained in an excellent article by Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., and 
Donald S. Cooper.63 Zerbe and Cooper assembled every case of alleged 
predatory pricing for which they could find sufficient data. They first evaluated 
whether the conduct in each of these forty cases was procompetitive or 
anticompetitive.64 They then analyzed how each of the forty cases would have 
come out under five relatively clear and predictable predatory pricing rules.65 
Zerbe and Cooper's analysis showed which of the five rules would have 
done the best job of deciding the forty actual examples of alleged predatory 
pricing for which they had been able to find data. In other words, they 
analyzed which of the five relatively predicable and clear rules would have 
yielded the best balance of Type I and Type II errors when applied to the real 
world's proffered sample of forty alleged predatory pricing cases. They then 
quite reasonably asserted that this rule also would be likely to do the best job 
deciding the next predatory pricing cases to reach the courtS.66 They 
accordingly argued that the courts should adopt the best of the five tested 
rules.67 
This same methodology should be applied to the discounting area. It 
would, of course, be an extremely large and difficult task-no doubt 
comparable to the time and intellectual effort expended by Zerbe and Cooper. 
61See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under 
Section 2 of the Shennan Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697, 700--33 (1975) (suggesting average 
variable cost as surrogate for marginal cost for predatory pricing analysis). 
62See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 841-45. 
63See Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical 
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEx. L. REV. 655 (1982). 
64See id. at 699-708, 704 tbl.3. 
65See id. at 704 tbl.3, 709-15. Among the rules they analyzed were the Areeda-Turner rule 
and per se legality. See also id. at 686-90, 696-99. 
66See id. at 715. 
671d. 
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To my knowledge, however, no one has even come close to doing such a 
combined theoretical and empirical study of the discounting area. In fact, it is 
doubtful a researcher today could find a similarly large group of comparable 
discount cases that contain enough data to analyze correctly. If I am correct 
then, sadly, there currently is no way to test whether Professor Hovenkamp's 
proposed rules are better than other plausible decision rules, such as the rule 
proposed only for discussion purposes below in Section V of this Article. Since 
we cannot currently perform the crucial empirical analysis, however, there is 
no basis for concluding that we should depart from the rule of reason approach 
to cases involving discounting by monopolists or would-be monopolists. 
V. ALTERNATIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS 
Although for now antitrust policymakers should continue to evaluate 
these discounts under a rule of reason, the field should start thinking about 
carving out a few modest presumptions of legality or illegality. They should 
only be adopted, however, if policymakers first can accumulate a reasonable 
amount of evidence that these rules or presumptions are likely to do more good 
than harm. 
Each of the following alternative rule or presumption possibilities rests, 
implicitly, upon assumptions that discounts are more likely to be 
anticompetitive, and that discounts' efficiencies are likely to be less common 
than D&E suggests. These options are presented for discussion purposes only 
since the empirical evidence that would support them, like the support for 
D&E's rules, is too thin. Each of these three rules or presumptions is designed 
only for cases involving single-product discounts.68 Each should help to 
enhance business planning and certainty. 
A. Ban All "First Dollar" Discounts by Firms with, or by Firms Attempting to 
Obtain, Monopoly Power 
The first possible rule would be to ban all "first dollar" discounts by firms 
with, or firms attempting to obtain, monopoly power, unless these discounts 
can be justified by efficiencies. (A "first dollar" discount would provide, e.g., 
that if a customer increases its purchases from 800 units to 1000 units, all the 
units it purchases will be priced at $100 instead of at $125 each.)69 However, 
68These presumptions should apply only in the single-product situation. If the monopolist 
sells more than one product, it could nominally sell product X for the same price to everyone but 
give customers that purchase product Y a discount on product Y in a manner that made this 
discount the equivalent of giving them a discount on product X. 
69This proposal is a simplified .version of the approach contained in the DG Competition 
Paper: 
Conditional rebates that are granted on all purchases in the reference period 
once a certain threshold is exceeded can have a strong foreclosure effect. ... If the 
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since customers like receiving discounts and discounts can give rise to 
efficiencies, the manufacturer could instead offer marginal or "step down" 
discounts as a less restrictive altemative.70 D&E does not present any evidence 
that any legitimate efficiency from discounting cannot be obtained by a 
manufacturer offering a price of, for example, $150 for the first 250 units, 
$125 for the next 250 units, $100 for the third 250 units, etc.7l These 
"marginal" or "step down" discounts would be legal, subject only to nonnal 
predatory pricing rules. By contrast, "first dollar" or "all purchases" discounts 
would be illegal unless they were justified by the defendant's proof that they 
were necessary to obtain significant efficiencies.72 
B. Attribute the Entire Discount to the Marginal Units They Help to Sell and 
Then Use Normal Predatory Pricing Rules 
The second proposed rule would not be to ban all "first dollar" discounts, 
but instead to attribute the entire discount on multiple units of a single product 
to the marginal units where sale of the marginal units is assisted by the 
discounts, and then to ban "negative pricing" completely and also to employ 
normal predatory pricing tests.73 However, there should not be a recoupment 
threshold is set above the amount that would otherwise be purchased, the rebate may 
induce the buyer to purchase more than it would otherwise do, in particular by 
diverting purchases from other suppliers to the dominant company, in order to be 
able to benefit from the rebate on all its purchases and thus effectively lower the 
price for all its purchases. 
In view of the above, where it is established that: (a) the dominant company 
applies a conditional rebate system where the rebates are granted on all purchases in 
a particular period once a certain threshold is exceeded, and (b) there is no indication 
that this threshold is set so low that for a good part of the dominant company's 
buyers it can not hinder them to switch to and purchase substantial additional 
amounts from other suppliers without losing the rebate, and (c) the required share 
exceeds the commercially viable amount per customer, and (d) the dominant 
company applies the rebate system to a good part of its buyers and this system 
therefore affects, if not most, at least a substantial part of market demand, and (e) 
there are no clear indications of a lack of foreclosure effect such as aggressive and 
significant entry and/or expansion by competitors and/or switching of customers, the 
Commission is likely to conclude that the rebate system creates a market distorting 
foreclosure effect and thus constitutes an abuse of the dominant position. 
DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, flI 152, 162, at 44, 49-50 (citation omitted). 
70lt is the retroactive nature of the "first dollar" discount that is suspect. 
71Nor do I know of any such evidence. 
nThe defendant would have the burden of proving that these significant efficiencies could 
not be achieved without the "first dollar" discounts. These efficiencies would not be presumed. 
73"Negative pricing" will be defined later in this subsection. These tests also should 
include a requirement that the defendant have monopoly power or is attempting to obtain 
monopoly power in a well-defined market. 
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requirement in these cases 74 because the exclusion achieved under these 
discounts can be costless for the firm undertaking the practices.75 
This is in fact a variation of Professor Hovenkamp's "attribution" test.76 
Although he developed this test for two-product situations, it easily could be 
used to evaluate the discounts involving just the marginal, contested units for 
one product, a virtually identical situation.77 Moreover, this approach was 
adopted in the recent DG Competition Paper on exclusionary practices under 
Article 82.78 
74For an explanation of the recoupment requirement, see Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225-26 (1993). For an explanation of why the 
recoupment requirement should not be extended to pricing schemes that do not require short-
term profit sacrifices to be successful, see John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary 
Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and 
Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 632, 636-37, 654-55 (2005). 
75 As the example in Section B demonstrates, the dominant firm need not lose anything in 
the short term by adopting these pricing schemes, and there is accordingly no need to recoup 
anything. As this example illustrates, sometimes "discounts" can be phony subterfuges; the 
"discounted price" can actually be the profit-maximizing monopoly price that the firm would 
like to charge, whereas the "list price" can be an artificially inflated price used to threaten and 
penalize customers. A recoupment requirement therefore would not serve as a meaningful way 
to filter out frivolous cases. Instead, it would at best be a superfluous burden that could 
discourage meritorious cases, and at worst it would immunize anticompetitive discounting. 
76See Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 853 ("To see whether a package price is 'exclusionary' 
in this sense, then, one simply attributes the entire discount on all products in the package to the 
product for which exclusion is claimed." (citations omitted». 
77This is because the demand for many products or services can be thought of as dividing 
into segments of varying degrees of contestability or competitiveness. Depending on the time 
and other factors involved, some customers are relatively locked in while others can readily 
switch. For this reason, a single product can be thought of as analogous to multiple products. 
The relatively competitive segment of a market for a single good can be thought of as the 
equivalent of being a different product from the relatively non-competitive segment. These 
market segments can be analyzed separately. 
If firms use all-units discounts or rebates and if part of an OEM's demand is locked-in to 
the dominant firm in the short run (because of staggered contracts, technical needs, etc.), the 
analysis of the single good case becomes very similar to the analysis of the bundled rebates case. 
The dominant firm can leverage its market power in the locked-in segment (i.e., the monopoly 
segment) to foreclose the rival from the rest of the OEM's purchases (the competitive segment). 
Thus, under certain conditions, single-product and multi-product discounts are virtually 
identical. 
Using Professor Hovenkamp's attribution test for the single-product discount situation 
would mean, in effect, considering the inframarginal and marginal units of the product in 
question as if they were different products that were being tied together. If Professor 
Hovenkamp's attribution test were used, the pricing would be illegal. 
78See DG COMPETITION PAPER, supra note 8, 'II'Il152-65, at 44-51. This suggests, albeit not 
very clearly, to attribute the entire discount on multiple units of a single product to the marginal 
units whose sale is helped by the discounts. Then predatory pricing tests presumably can be 
used. 
In case the required share differs significantly between customers because of 
differing rebates, the Commission will not calculate the average share for all 
customers but an average share per group of customers with a similar rebate. It will 
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In the example discussed above, this approach would entail attributing the 
entire discount, for all 1000 units, to the marginal 200 units that the discount 
helped to sell. Specifically, in this example this would mean attributing a 
discount of $25 x 1000 = $25,000 to the marginal 200 units. If we do this, we 
correctly see that the marginal units are being sold for nothing.79 If we perform 
this attribution, then the cost of the software to MS would be positive80 while is 
price would be zero. MS accordingly would correctly be found to have 
engaged in unlawful predatory pricing.81 Alternatively, if the facts were 
evaluate the importance of these different groups of customers for entry and 
expansion. 
[d. 'lI 155 n.101, at 46. 
Box: A retro-active rebate and calculation of the effective price 
Rebate of 2.5% on all sales once St> 1,000,000 
St is the purchased amount in the reference period 
Price per unit = 100 before rebate Price per unit = 97.5 after rebate 
Commercially viable amount = 5% or 50,000 units 
With rebate: 1,000,000 x 97.5 = 97,500,000 
Without rebate: 950,000 x 100 = 95,000,000 
The difference of 2,500,000 is what is paid for the last 50,000 units over which 
the suction effect is calculated 
P effective (Pe) over the last 5% = 2,500,000 1 50,000 = 50 
The question is thus whether or not ATC > 50 47 
Box: calculation of the required share in case of a uniform rebate % 
The required share (RQS) is calculated as follows: 
RQS = R x P/(P - ATC) 
Where R is the rebate percentage customers obtain once they have purchased 
more than the threshold, P is the (list) price without the rebate and ATC is the 
average total cost of producing the product of the dominant company. 
For instance, where the rebate is 5%, P is 100 and ATC is 75: 
RQS = 5% x 100/(100 - 75) = 20% 
[d. 'lI'lI 154-55, at 46-47. The DG Competition Paper says similar things in the tying section: 
The incremental price that customers pay for each of the dominant company's 
products in the bundle should therefore cover the long run incremental costs of the 
dominant company of including this product in the bundle. This would allow an 
equally efficient competitor with only one product to compete profitably against the 
bundle. 
[d. 'lI 190, at 57 (footnote omitted). 
79The nominal cost of the marginal 200 units would be 125 x 200 = $25,000, which would 
equal the discount attributed to them. 
80While the marginal cost of producing and distributing software is very low, it is not zero. 
81This outcome would be more likely to occur if we attribute some of the development 
costs of the software to the cost of each unit of the software, as Professor Hovenkamp suggests 
in footnote 9 of his article. Hovenkamp, supra note I, at 842 n.9. If this were done, MS certainly 
would be seIling unit numbers 801 to 1000 for far less than cost; thus, under the attribution test 
MS surely would be guilty of predatory pricing. 
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different, and if the discounted price were above cost82 even after attributing 
the entire discount to the marginal output,83 then MS's discounts should be 
legal. 
In the extreme, the use of this attribution rule could mean that some sales 
would (correctly) be found to be at negative prices! In the example presented 
above, suppose that the price was $125 for each unit until the 1000th unit was 
purchased, in which case the retroactive price for every unit would be $100. 
This would mean that the cost for 999 units would be 999 x $125 = $124,875, 
while the cost of 1000 units would be 1000 x 100 = $100,000. This would 
mean that the actual "cost" of the 1000th unit to the purchaser would be 
negative $24,875! This type of discount should be per se illegal, and any 
retroactive discount that could result in negative pricing should be per se 
illegal. 
This type of functional or disguised negative pricing does not reflect 
efficiency or produce enhanced long-term planning (other that the certainty 
that comes from the elimination of competition) or any other legitimate 
benefits. Rather, it forces the purchaser to buy a quantity calculated by the 
monopolist to harm its rivals or would-be rivals. This pricing structure almost 
certainly is motivated by a dominant firm's desire to exclude or weaken 
smaller firms or would-be entrants. Moreover, if the discount were correctly 
attributed to the marginal units, the dominant firm would clearly be guilty of 
predatory pricing.84 
However, a predatory pricing test--even one as theoretically sound as the 
one proposed in this Section-would as a practical matter snare the parties into 
the expensive, unpredictable, daunting quagmire, one that almost always ends 
in a finding of legality that characterizes predatory pricing litigation. For this 
reason, the previous alternative-banning all "retroactive" or "all purchases" 
discounts unless they can be justified by significant efficiencies-would be 
preferable. 
82Whether pricing was "above cost" would be decided under the applicable predatory 
pricin~ rule. 
3This also assumes the acceptance of Professor Hovenkamp's refinement of the average 
variable cost standard, as articulated in footnote 9 of D&E. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 842 
n.9. 
84As noted earlier, any legitimate purpose of the discounting could instead be achieved by 
a marginal or "step down" discount; i.e., a price of $150 for the first 250 units, $125 for the next 
250 units, $100 for the third 250 units, etc. It is the retroactive nature of the discount that is 
suspect. 
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C. Published Quantity-Based Discounts That Are Available to Everyone 
Should be Legal, Unless They Violate Normal Predatory Pricing Rules 
Finally, published discounts that are quantity-based (not percentage-of-
use based85) and are available to everyone, with no other products or services 
involved or other strings attached, should also be legal, unless they violate 
normal predatory pricing rules.86 The rationale for this rule would be that the 
exclusion strategy outlined earlier is based on the monopolist targeting its 
rival's marketing efforts to specific customers. Any defendant that wanted its 
conduct to fall within this safe harbor would not be permitted to go to OEM A 
and tell it (as they would if they were targeting entry) that its discount kicks in 
at 800 units a month, while it kicks in only at 1000 units a month for customer 
B and at 500 units a month for customer C.87 
An objection to all of these proposed rules is that they might not go far 
enough and would fail to immunize many beneficial instances of price 
discrimination, or would fail to condemn many anticompetitive uses of 
discounting. This criticism might be valid; these approaches might well be too 
cautious. Regardless, in light of the paucity of real-word experience with 
discounts by monopolists or firms seeking to achieve monopoly power, these 
positions should, for now, only be analyzed and tested empirically by the 
antitrust community. 
85 A discount that was percentage-of-use based could have the same effect as a discount 
that was retroactive. For example, the retroactive discount described in Section I1.B supra could 
be considered to be a discount that required a 100% use share. 
8~e Robinson-Patman Act would sometimes require this option anyway. See 15 U.S.c. 
§§ \3 (a)-(f), 21(a) (2000). It requires that sellers to competing resellers not discriminate in the 
prices charged to different "purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or 
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce," and these price 
differences detrimentally affect competition. [d. § 13(a). Sellers must sell to all competing 
resellers who purchase the identical quantity of products at the same price. They can offer cost-
justified quantity discounts, but must justify the discounts and make the same discounts 
available to all competing resellers. [d. Section B of the Act provides that the burden of proof is 
on the defendant to show a justification for this price discrimination. [d. § 13(b). Section C of 
the Act provides for a number of exceptions. /d. § 13(c). However, the Robinson-Patman Act 
only applies to commodities. [d. Many high-tech products can be customized so as to no longer 
be a commodity. 
87It is possible, however, that even this alternative could inadvertently immunize some 
instances of anti competitive behavior because discounts that are quantity-based and available to 
anyone can still be exclusionary. If most purchasers in the industry have similar sizes and face a 
predictable demand, the quantity requirement could easily be chosen to mimic a share 
requirement. Furthermore, even if OEMs are of different sizes, the dominant firm could offer all 
OEMs the same contract with quantity-based discounts, with different discount rates applying at 
different quantity thresholds (e.g., 10% at 1000 units, 20% at 1500 units, etc.). In this case 
buyers will choose the most appropriate quantity threshold for their size, but, if skillfully 
designed, these contracts could still produce a substantial amount of exclusivity. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a time-honored tradition among academics of devising possible 
rules and thrusting them into the free marketplace of ideas. These rules are 
often ignored, but sometimes are subject to the wonderfully Hegelian dialectic 
of thesis-anti thesis-synthesis. The interactions of many such attempts by a 
disparate group of academics can eventually act to produce a sound public 
policy decision that can be relied upon by the enforcers and the courts. 
But Professor Hovenkamp is not just another academic. He is the 
preeminent antitrust scholar of our generation, in part because he is the able 
steward of the uniquely respected Areeda-Tumer-Hovenkamp Treatise.88 He is 
generally perceived as a reasonable centrist, and Professor Hovenkamp and the 
treatise have been cited hundreds of times by courtS.89 This gives him a special 
responsibility to show restraint until he can be sure what the correct rule should 
be. 
For now, Professor Hovenkamp should conclude that it is premature to 
devise such a comprehensive set of rules to govern this area of antitrust law.9o 
This is especially true because retroactive discounts-unlike regular discounts 
that apply to forward looking units and almost always are procompetitive-
have a great potential to cause anticompetitive effects. There is a real danger 
that if an inappropriate rule is promulgated and adopted by some antitrust 
88See PHILLIP AREEDA, DONALD F. TuRNER & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN 
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR ApPLICATION (Little, Brown & Co. 1978). 
89 A search on February 23, 2006, in Westlaw, in the ALLCASES database, for "antitrust 
& Hovenkamp" found 609 citations. To find citations to the treatise, a search in this database for 
"antitrust law" & "(Hovenkamp & Areeda)" found 511 references. 
Remarkably similar numbers of citations were found when these same searches were run 
in Lexis, in the "Federal and State Cases Combined" database: 609 and 509 citations, 
respectively. (The author is grateful to Robert Pool for these search results.) 
9~e Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, arguing against the granting of 
certiorari in 3M Company v. LePage's [nc., signed by Solicitor General, Ted Olsen, Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust Hew Pate, and others, is instructive: 
There is insufficient experience with bundled discounts to this point to make a 
firm judgment about the relative prevalence of exclusionary versus procompetitive 
bundled discounts. Relative to the practice of predatory pricing ... there is less 
knowledge on which to assess whether, or to what extent, the legal approach to a 
monopolist's allegedly exclusionary bundled discounts should be driven by a strong 
concern for false positives and low risk of false negatives .... Further empirical 
development may shed light on that question . 
. . . [T]he Court should not attempt to craft an alternative test. Instead, the Court 
would be well served to await further development of the case law, and further 
insights from academic commentary .... 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14-15, 3M Co. v. 
LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (No. 02-1865), 2004 WL 1205191, available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf (citation omitted). 
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decision makers, the field could be stuck with it for decades. Discounts should, 
for now, be evaluated under the rule of reason. The most we should consider 
doing now is to discuss modest and non-controversial rules of legality and 
illegality. However, the state of our empirical knowledge does not permit us to 
go any further. 
